Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: how larger markets reduce profit taxes

DOI10.1111/IERE.12010MaRDI QIDQ4620092zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Haufler, Frank Stähler

Publication date 7 February 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric Nash equilibriumheterogeneous firmstax competitiontwo-country model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Multisectoral models in economics (91B66) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

• A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
• Asymmetric capital tax competition with profit shifting
• Cooperate tax competition, tariffs and multinational firms
• Tax competition in a Bertrand model
• Search costs and corporate income tax competition

Cited in

(20)

• Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
• Tax competition in a Bertrand model
• Tax competition under the threat of capital flight
• Cooperate tax competition, tariffs and multinational firms
• Effective tax rates, endogenous mark-ups and heterogeneous firms
• Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition
• Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?
• Search costs and corporate income tax competition
• An extension of the home-attachment criteria under dynamic tax competition
• Firm taxation and the endogenous distribution of markups
• An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars
• A model of tax competition under taxpayers' local competition
• Multinational firms mitigate tax competition
• Corporate profit tax, firm entry with unemployment, and income inequality
• ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND AGGLOMERATION OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION WITH TRANSFER PRICING
• The effects of trade liberalization on tax avoidance
• Asymmetric capital tax competition with profit shifting
• Does tax competition really promote growth?
• A simplified model of tax collection from enterprises in the presence of legal and shadow capital
• International relocation, the real exchange rate and welfare

This page was built for publication: Tax competition in a simple model with heterogeneous firms: how larger markets reduce profit taxes

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4620092)