Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem

DOI10.1111/IERE.12027MaRDI QIDQ4620110zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Niemann, Paul Pichler, Gerhard Sorger

Publication date 7 February 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://repository.essex.ac.uk/2902/1/dp687.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic noncooperative gameinterest rate policydiscretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makersmonetary instrumentsmoney growth policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25) Interest rates, asset pricing, etc. (stochastic models) (91G30)

Recommendations

• Central bank independence and public debt policy
• On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
• Independent monetary policies and social equity
• Introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union
• Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks

Cited in

(4)

• On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
• Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation
• Independent monetary policies and social equity
• Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model

This page was built for publication: Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4620110)