Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4651467
DOI10.1137/S0097539701397059zbMath1080.90046MaRDI QIDQ4651467
Publication date: 21 February 2005
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
90B35: Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
68W25: Approximation algorithms
68W20: Randomized algorithms
Related Items
A Method with Convergence Rates for Optimization Problems with Variational Inequality Constraints, Congestion games with priority-based scheduling, Using Temporal Dummy Players in Cost-Sharing Games, Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games, Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games, Efficient methods for selfish network design, On Stackelberg mixed strategies, The price of optimum: complexity and approximation for a matching game, Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow, A selfish routing based network improvement problem, Connectivity and equilibrium in random games, Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism, Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. I: Static problems, Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games, The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions, Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks, Bilevel programming and applications, Non-atomic one-round walks in congestion games, Line planning with user-optimal route choice, System optimal routing of traffic flows with user constraints using linear programming, Modeling and mitigating link-flooding distributed denial-of-service attacks via learning in Stackelberg games, Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions, The price of anarchy of affine congestion games with similar strategies, Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy, Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players, On Stackelberg strategies in affine congestion games, Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies, Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling, Collusion in atomic splittable routing games, Solution for a class of closed-loop leader-follower games with convexity conditions on the payoffs, Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks, Stackelberg network pricing games, On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard, A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time, Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games, Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate, On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games, Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players, A Selective Tour Through Congestion Games, Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
