Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
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Publication:465675
DOI10.1016/J.COSREV.2010.09.008zbMATH Open1298.68290OpenAlexW2096516275MaRDI QIDQ465675FDOQ465675
Philippas Tsigas, P. G. Spirakis, Shlomi Dolev, Elad M. Schiller
Publication date: 24 October 2014
Published in: Computer Science Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2010.09.008
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Noncooperative games (91A10) Distributed algorithms (68W15) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Distributed systems (68M14)
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