Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
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Publication:465675
DOI10.1016/j.cosrev.2010.09.008zbMath1298.68290MaRDI QIDQ465675
Philippas Tsigas, Shlomi Dolev, Elad M. Schiller, Paul G. Spirakis
Publication date: 24 October 2014
Published in: Computer Science Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2010.09.008
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)
68M14: Distributed systems
68W15: Distributed algorithms
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