Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters *

DOI10.1023/B:EUFI.0000035192.50642.68zbMath1106.91330OpenAlexW2013032997WikidataQ57388236 ScholiaQ57388236MaRDI QIDQ4672034

Xavier Vives, Luis Angel Medrano

Publication date: 29 April 2005

Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/b:eufi.0000035192.50642.68

zbMATH Keywords

hedgingwelfareinsider tradingspeculationnoise tradersselective disclosurereal investment`abstain-or-disclose' rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Insider trading and the short-swing profit rule ⋮ Dynamic noisy rational expectations equilibrium with insider information: welfare and regulation ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Should we regulate financial information? ⋮ Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

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