Friends and enemies: A model of signed network formation

DOI10.3982/TE1937zbMath1396.91044OpenAlexW1509216073MaRDI QIDQ4682784

Timo Hiller

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1937

zbMATH Keywords

contest success functionstructural balanceinternational relationsbullyingeconomics of conflictsigned network formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Related Items (8)

Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest ⋮ Relationship externalities ⋮ Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks ⋮ Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks ⋮ Stability of alliance networks ⋮ Signed network formation games and clustering balance ⋮ The strategy of conquest ⋮ A bandwagon bias based model for opinion dynamics: Intertwining between homophily and influence mechanisms

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