Exploring the optimal design of an employer-sponsored sickness-disability compensation insurance plan when sickness presenteeism is penalized

DOI10.1080/10920277.2018.1435287MaRDI QIDQ4689974zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Colin M. Ramsay, Victor I. Oguledo, Annika Krutto

Publication date 22 October 2018

Published in North American Actuarial Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/10920277.2018.1435287

zbMATH Keywords

absenteeismoptimal designpresenteeismpresenteeism penaltysickness presenteeismsickness-disability compensation insurance plan

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking
• Consumption Over the Life Cycle
• Gaussian quadrature formulas for the numerica l integration of Bromwich's integral and the inversion of the Laplace transform
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• Numerical Inversion of Laplace Transforms Using Laguerre Functions
• Numerical inversion of the Laplace transform: a survey and comparison of methods
• On blocked Poisson processes in risk theory
• Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• The Accurate Numerical Inversion of Laplace Transforms
• The asymptotic ruin problem when the healthy and sick periods form an alternating renewal process

Cited in

(4)

• Wage compensation for job-related illness: Evidence from a matched employer and employee survey in the UK
• Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
• Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment
• Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Algorithm 368

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