Exploring the Optimal Design of an Employer-Sponsored Sickness-Disability Compensation Insurance Plan When Sickness Presenteeism Is Penalized

DOI10.1080/10920277.2018.1435287zbMath1416.91218OpenAlexW2802520320WikidataQ129975401 ScholiaQ129975401MaRDI QIDQ4689974

Colin M. Ramsay, Victor I. Oguledo, Annika Krutto

Publication date: 22 October 2018

Published in: North American Actuarial Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/10920277.2018.1435287

zbMATH Keywords

optimal designabsenteeismpresenteeismpresenteeism penaltysickness presenteeismsickness-disability compensation insurance plan

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment

Uses Software

• Algorithm 368

Cites Work

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• On blocked Poisson processes in risk theory
• The asymptotic ruin problem when the healthy and sick periods form an alternating renewal process
• Gaussian quadrature formulas for the numerica l integration of Bromwich's integral and the inversion of the Laplace transform
• The Accurate Numerical Inversion of Laplace Transforms
• Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking
• Consumption Over the Life Cycle
• Numerical Inversion of Laplace Transforms Using Laguerre Functions

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