Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs
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Publication:471435
DOI10.1007/s13235-013-0085-8zbMath1300.91024WikidataQ124925972 ScholiaQ124925972MaRDI QIDQ471435
Farnaz Taherkhani, Hassan Benchekroun
Publication date: 14 November 2014
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/03-2013-cah.pdf
91A12: Cooperative games
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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