Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters
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Publication:4787892
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.t01-1-00028zbMath1029.91528OpenAlexW2023591553MaRDI QIDQ4787892
Publication date: 8 January 2003
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.t01-1-00028
Related Items (10)
Free trade: What are the terms-of-trade effects? ⋮ Existence of trading Nash equilibrium in tariff retaliation models ⋮ The structure of optimal tariff rates in a large country with market power ⋮ Does a larger country set a higher optimal tariff with monopolistic competition and capital accumulation? ⋮ TARIFF RETALIATION AND THE FREE TRADE ARGUMENT ⋮ BUYING LOCALLY ⋮ Coalition-enhancing fiscal policies in an open economy: a CES framework of Gale's transfer paradox ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibrium tariffs ⋮ Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model ⋮ Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model
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