Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
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Publication:4799853
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00095zbMath1055.91530MaRDI QIDQ4799853
Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00095
limited commitment; time consistency; renegotiation; costly state verification; stochastic monitoring
91B14: Social choice
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