Voting on Majority Rules
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Publication:4810826
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00278zbMath1066.91023MaRDI QIDQ4810826
Mattias K. Polborn, Matthias Messner
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00278
91B12: Voting theory
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