Managerial ownership with rent-seeking employees

DOI10.1007/S10436-013-0225-6MaRDI QIDQ481368zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Linus Wilson

Publication date 12 December 2014

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-013-0225-6

zbMATH Keywords

CEO compensationcontractscorporate controlrent-seekingshareholdersunions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Recommendations

• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Firm competition and incentive pay: rent seeking at work
• A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates
• Unions and strategic managerial incentives
• Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms?

Cites work

• Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
• Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Leadership Style and Incentives

Cited in

(1)

• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

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