Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
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Publication:485770
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.004zbMath1302.91051OpenAlexW1694007784MaRDI QIDQ485770
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Theodore L. Turocy, Roman M. Sheremeta
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.004
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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