Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games

DOI10.2307/2171776zbMath0841.90128OpenAlexW1988982686MaRDI QIDQ4859519

Leo K. Simon, Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

Publication date: 7 January 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171776

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementfinite approximationsperfect and proper equilibriainfinite normal form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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