Performance Verifiability and Output Sharing in Collaborative Ventures

DOI10.1287/MNSC.42.1.93MaRDI QIDQ4887777zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tailan Chi

Publication date 25 November 1996

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.1.93

zbMATH Keywords

transaction costsjoint venturesdouble moral hazardresidual claimancycontracting between two firmsself-enforcing mechanism of output sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Output shares in bilateral agency contracts
• Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures
• The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract
• Partnership in a dynamic production system with unobservable actions and noncontractible output
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing

Cited in

(3)

• Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty
• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
• Partial ownership and cross-border mergers

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