Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows

DOI10.1007/S10479-013-1425-1zbMATH Open1308.91060OpenAlexW2062557593MaRDI QIDQ490193FDOQ490193

Authors: Heiner Ackermann, Hendrik Ewe, Karl-Heinz Küfer, Michael Schröder 

Publication date: 22 January 2015

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://kluedo.ub.uni-kl.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2317

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Maximal Flow Through a Network
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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• Cores of convex games
• Combinatorial auctions: a survey
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Set Partitioning: A survey
• Collaborating freight forwarding enterprises
• Horizontal cooperation among freight carriers: request allocation and profit sharing
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions

Cited In (1)

• Allocating revenues in a Smart TV ecosystem

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