Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005zbMath1334.91007OpenAlexW2153757941MaRDI QIDQ490424

David C. Parkes, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date: 27 August 2015

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

corepower indicescoalitional game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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Uses Software

• SNAP

Cites Work

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