Accuracy in contests: players' perspective

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0166-9zbMATH Open1329.91120OpenAlexW2003253992MaRDI QIDQ490946FDOQ490946

Authors: Mustafa Yildirim 

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0746.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

accuracycontestsfavoritegoal-line technologyunderdog

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• The theory of contests: a survey
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Information in conflicts.
• Contests with multiple rounds
• Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• The optimal accuracy level in asymmetric contests

Cited In (1)

• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players

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