The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
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Publication:4942169
DOI10.1017/CBO9780511498497zbMath0941.62005MaRDI QIDQ4942169
Publication date: 21 March 2000
91B06: Decision theory
62A01: Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence
62-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to statistics
03B48: Probability and inductive logic
62C05: General considerations in statistical decision theory
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