The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
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Publication:4942169
DOI10.1017/CBO9780511498497zbMath0941.62005MaRDI QIDQ4942169
Publication date: 21 March 2000
Decision theory (91B06) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to statistics (62-02) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) General considerations in statistical decision theory (62C05)
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