Adaptive Incentive Design
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Publication:4957641
DOI10.1109/TAC.2020.3027503zbMATH Open1471.91083arXiv1806.05749OpenAlexW3090662669MaRDI QIDQ4957641FDOQ4957641
Authors: Lillian J. Ratliff, Tanner Fiez 
Publication date: 9 September 2021
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the process by which the strategic agents make decisions. Under the assumption that the agents are utility maximizers, we model their interactions as a non-cooperative game and utilize the Nash equilibrium concept as well as myopic update rules to model the selection of their decision. By parameterizing the agents' utility functions and the incentives offered, we develop an algorithm that the planner can employ to learn the agents' decision-making processes while simultaneously designing incentives to change their response to a more desirable response from the planner's perspective. We provide convergence results for this algorithm both in the noise-free and noisy cases and present illustrative examples.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.05749
Applications of game theory (91A80) 2-person games (91A05) Utility theory (91B16) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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