Status maximization as a source of fairness in a networked dictator game

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Publication:4958764

DOI10.1093/COMNET/CNY022zbMATH Open1471.91402arXiv1806.05542OpenAlexW2962875040WikidataQ115000067 ScholiaQ115000067MaRDI QIDQ4958764FDOQ4958764


Authors: J. E. Snellman, Gerardo Iñiguez, Rafael A. Barrio, J. Kertész, Kimmo Kaski Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 15 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Complex Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have traditionally been illustrated experimentally via simple games like the dictator and ultimatum games. Experiments with these games suggest that, beyond rational economic thinking, human decision-making processes are influenced by social preferences, such as an inclination to fairness. In this study we suggest that the apparent gap between competitive and altruistic human tendencies can be bridged by assuming that people are primarily maximising their status, i.e., a utility function different from simple profit maximisation. To this end we analyse a simple agent-based model, where individuals play the repeated dictator game in a social network they can modify. As model parameters we consider the living costs and the rate at which agents forget infractions by others. We find that individual strategies used in the game vary greatly, from selfish to selfless, and that both of the above parameters determine when individuals form complex and cohesive social networks.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.05542




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