Testing passive versus symmetric beliefs in contracting with externalities

DOI10.1111/IERE.12492MaRDI QIDQ4959679zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daiqiang Zhang

Publication date 17 September 2021

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12492

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Contracting with Externalities
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities

Cited in

(2)

• Identification of participation constraints in contracts
• A structural analysis of simple contracts

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