Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions*

DOI10.1093/qje/qjv022zbMath1400.91335OpenAlexW3124616507MaRDI QIDQ4963049

Manuel Amador, G. Gopinath, Mark Aguiar, Emmanuel Farhi

Publication date: 6 November 2018

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.511

zbMATH Keywords

monetary unionfiscal and monetary policyself-fulfilling debt crisessovereign debt markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (4)

Income inequality and sovereign default ⋮ Game of thrones: accommodating monetary policies in a monetary union ⋮ Envelope condition method with an application to default risk models ⋮ A continuous-time model of sovereign debt

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