Why did Weyl think that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of pure phenomenology?

DOI10.1080/01445340.2013.860732MaRDI QIDQ4983353zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Iulian D. Toader

Publication date 25 March 2015

Published in History and Philosophy of Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2013.860732

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03)

Recommendations

• Husserlian and Fichtean leanings: Weyl on logicism, intuitionism, and formalism
• Hermann Weyl's Intuitionistic Mathematics
• Intuition and conceptual construction in Weyl's analysis of the problem of space
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• Intuition Between the Analytic-Continental Divide: Hermann Weyl's Philosophy of the Continuum

Cites work

• A Half-Century of Mathematics
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3051296 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mathematics and Phenomenology: The Correspondence between O. Becker and H. Weyl
• The Mathematical Way of Thinking

Cited in

(3)

• Introduction to the special issue Hermann Weyl and the philosophy of the `New Physics'
• Husserlian and Fichtean leanings: Weyl on logicism, intuitionism, and formalism
• Hermann Weyl's Intuitionistic Mathematics

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