Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.12.006MaRDI QIDQ498790zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kfir Eliaz, Françoise Forges

Publication date 29 September 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot duopolyinformation structureverifiable information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
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Cites work

• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
• Information in conflicts.
• On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(10)

• The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.
• Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
• Disclosure, competition, and learning from asset prices
• Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
• Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
• Interactive information design
• Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals
• The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions
• A note on revelation of information for joint production
• Duopoly information sharing with differentiated products

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