Raising rivals' cost through buyer power

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.12.011zbMATH Open1321.91045OpenAlexW2042760609WikidataQ57389914 ScholiaQ57389914MaRDI QIDQ498798FDOQ498798

Authors: Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Justus Haucap, Christian Wey 

Publication date: 29 September 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.011

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zbMATH Keywords

price discriminationbuyer powerraising rivals' cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (6)

• Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
• Should price increases be targeted? Pricing power and selective vs. across-the-board price increases
• Inflating profits and industry competitiveness
• Input price discrimination with two-part tariffs and quantity competition
• Enhancing bargaining power with most-favored-customer pricing
• Price discrimination and sequential contracting in monopolistic input markets

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