Learning with minimal information in continuous games

DOI10.3982/TE3435zbMath1466.91036arXiv1806.11506MaRDI QIDQ4992070

Mario Bravo, Sebastian Bervoets, Mathieu Faure

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.11506

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic approximationcontinuous gamespayoff-based learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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