On the complexity of constructive control under nearly single-peaked preferences

DOI10.3233/FAIA200099MaRDI QIDQ4999240zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yongjie Yang

Publication date 6 July 2021

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03539

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12)

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• The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
• On the parameterized complexity of controlling amendment and successive winners
• Structure of single-peaked preferences
• Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications
• Computational aspects of nearly single-peaked electorates
• Structured preferences: a literature survey

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