Terminal ranking games
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Publication:5026440
Abstract: We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schr"{o}dinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players' welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4080537 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(14)- Tournament-induced risk-shifting: a mean field games approach
- Cournot-Nash equilibrium and optimal transport in a dynamic setting
- The role of correlation in diffusion control ranking games
- Reward design in risk-taking contests
- Ranking games and gambling: when to quit when you're ahead
- Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies
- X-games
- Mean Field Contest with Singularity
- Effort expenditure for cash flow in a mean-field equilibrium
- Teamwise mean field competitions
- Large tournament games
- Optimal Relative Performance Criteria in Mean-Field Contribution Games
- Time Inconsistency, Precommitment, and Equilibrium Strategies for a Stackelberg Game
- A rank-based mean field game in the strong formulation
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