Popular branchings and their dual certificates
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Publication:5041748
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-45771-6_18zbMATH Open1503.90149arXiv1912.01854OpenAlexW3016662321MaRDI QIDQ5041748FDOQ5041748
Authors: Telikepalli Kavitha, Tamás Király, Jannik Matuschke, Ildikó Schlotter, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Publication date: 14 October 2022
Published in: Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Let be a digraph where every node has preferences over its incoming edges. The preferences of a node extend naturally to preferences over branchings, i.e., directed forests; a branching is popular if does not lose a head-to-head election (where nodes cast votes) against any branching. Such popular branchings have a natural application in liquid democracy. The popular branching problem is to decide if admits a popular branching or not. We give a characterization of popular branchings in terms of dual certificates and use this characterization to design an efficient combinatorial algorithm for the popular branching problem. When preferences are weak rankings, we use our characterization to formulate the popular branching polytope in the original space and also show that our algorithm can be modified to compute a branching with least unpopularity margin. When preferences are strict rankings, we show that "approximately popular" branchings always exist.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.01854
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