When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.07.001zbMATH Open1368.91116OpenAlexW2488255178MaRDI QIDQ504391FDOQ504391

Authors: Wonki Jo Cho 

Publication date: 16 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.07.001

Recommendations

• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
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zbMATH Keywords

sd-efficiencysd-no-envypreference richnessprobabilistic serial assignmentrecursive decomposabilitytop-objects divisibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Single-peaked orders on a tree
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
• Random assignment under weak preferences
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
• Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
• A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
• Allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences
• Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
• Random assignment: redefining the serial rule

Cited In (7)

• A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
• Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
• Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
• The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
• Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains

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