Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.11.004zbMATH Open1397.91168DBLPjournals/mss/GrofmanFF17OpenAlexW2557097743WikidataQ57254373 ScholiaQ57254373MaRDI QIDQ505282FDOQ505282

Authors: Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld, Jon Fraenkel 

Publication date: 19 January 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.004

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zbMATH Keywords

Dowdall rulesmulti-seat scoring rulesthreshold of exclusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Geometry of voting
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• On the justice of decision rules
• The Borda count and agenda manipulation
• The original Borda count and partial voting
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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