Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.11.004MaRDI QIDQ505282zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld, Jon Fraenkel

Publication date 19 January 2017

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

Dowdall rulesmulti-seat scoring rulesthreshold of exclusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3591759 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Geometry of voting
• On the justice of decision rules
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The Borda count and agenda manipulation
• The original Borda count and partial voting

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