Strategic thinking under social influence: scalability, stability and robustness of allocations
DOI10.1016/J.EJCON.2016.04.006zbMATH Open1355.91004OpenAlexW2342580561MaRDI QIDQ508367FDOQ508367
Authors: Dario Bauso, Tamer Başar
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: European Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102222/1/EJCBausoBasar_FINAL.pdf
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Cooperative games (91A12) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Small world graphs, complex networks (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C82) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Stochastic systems in control theory (general) (93E03)
Cites Work
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- Introduction to game theory
- On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games
- Robust dynamic cooperative games
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- Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining Among Players' Neighbors
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