Strong Separations Between Broadcast and Authenticated Channels

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.DISC.2018.36zbMATH Open1497.68047OpenAlexW2898905608MaRDI QIDQ5090929FDOQ5090929

Authors: Julian Loss, Ueli M. Maurer, Daniel Tschudi 

Publication date: 21 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.36

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zbMATH Keywords

broadcastcryptographyimpossibilitymulti-party computation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Modes of computation (nondeterministic, parallel, interactive, probabilistic, etc.) (68Q10) Distributed systems (68M14)

Cites Work

• Player simulation and general adversary structures in perfect multiparty computation
• On the price of equivocation in Byzantine agreement
• The Weak Byzantine Generals Problem
• The Byzantine Generals Problem
• From partial consistency to global broadcast
• Detectable Byzantine agreement secure against faulty majorities
• Efficient general-adversary multi-party computation
• Byzantine agreement given partial broadcast
• Towards a Theory of Consistency Primitives
• On Byzantine Agreement over (2,3)-Uniform Hypergraphs
• Broadcast from minicast secure against general adversaries
• Broadcast amplification

Cited In (1)

• Broadcast amplification

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