Strong Separations Between Broadcast and Authenticated Channels
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Publication:5090929
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1857529
- Authenticated broadcast with a partially compromised public-key infrastructure
- Secure Pseudonymous Channels
- Secure Channels Based on Authenticated Encryption Schemes: A Simple Characterization
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1231619
- Secure implementation of channel abstractions
- Strongly Secure Multiuser Communication and Authentication With Anonymity Constraints
Cites work
- Broadcast amplification
- Broadcast from minicast secure against general adversaries
- Byzantine agreement given partial broadcast
- Detectable Byzantine agreement secure against faulty majorities
- Efficient general-adversary multi-party computation
- From partial consistency to global broadcast
- On Byzantine Agreement over (2,3)-Uniform Hypergraphs
- On the price of equivocation in Byzantine agreement
- Player simulation and general adversary structures in perfect multiparty computation
- The Byzantine Generals Problem
- The Weak Byzantine Generals Problem
- Towards a Theory of Consistency Primitives
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