Licensing by Fixed-Fee and Two-Part Tariff in a Differentiated Stackelberg Model when the Follower is the Innovator

DOI10.5890/JAND.2022.12.003zbMath1498.91221OpenAlexW4291327252MaRDI QIDQ5106135

Flávio Ferreira, Oana Ruxandra Tuns (Bode)

Publication date: 16 September 2022

Published in: Journal of Applied Nonlinear Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.5890/jand.2022.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryStackelberg modellicensing differentiated goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival incorporating ad valorem royalties
• Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing
• Licensing in an International Competition with Differentiated Goods

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