The new and old ignorance puzzles: how badly do we need closure?

DOI10.1007/S11229-014-0642-8zbMATH OpenNoneOpenAlexW1999640533MaRDI QIDQ514112FDOQ514112

Authors: Brent G. Kyle 

Publication date: 8 March 2017

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philpapers.org/rec/KYLTNA

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zbMATH Keywords

closureknowledgeskepticismignorancecontextualismabominable conjunctionsambiguity theory of knowledgeconditional perfectionimplicaturenegative strengthening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Control System Dynamics
• Elusive knowledge

Cited In (4)

• Truth and ignorance
• The need for closure
• Axiomatizing Rumsfeld ignorance
• A logic for disjunctive ignorance

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