The new and old ignorance puzzles: how badly do we need closure?

DOI10.1007/S11229-014-0642-8MaRDI QIDQ514112zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brent G. Kyle

Publication date 8 March 2017

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://philpapers.org/rec/KYLTNA

zbMATH Keywords

closureknowledgeskepticismignorancecontextualismabominable conjunctionsambiguity theory of knowledgeconditional perfectionimplicaturenegative strengthening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Recommendations

• The knower paradox and epistemic closure
• Williamson, closure, and KK
• Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility
• When does epistemic closure fail?
• Information and closure

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3151566 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3799981 (Why is no real title available?)
• Control System Dynamics
• Elusive knowledge

Cited in

(4)

• Truth and ignorance
• The need for closure
• Axiomatizing Rumsfeld ignorance
• A logic for disjunctive ignorance

This page was built for publication: The new and old ignorance puzzles: how badly do we need closure?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q514112)