The Bayesian who knew too much
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Publication:514114
DOI10.1007/s11229-014-0647-3zbMath1357.03014arXiv1412.8488OpenAlexW3105089626MaRDI QIDQ514114
Publication date: 8 March 2017
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.8488
ignoranceindifferenceBayesian confirmation theoryprinciple of indifferenceanthropic reasoningdoomsday argumentimprecise credence
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)
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Cites Work
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