The Bayesian who knew too much

DOI10.1007/s11229-014-0647-3zbMath1357.03014arXiv1412.8488OpenAlexW3105089626MaRDI QIDQ514114

Yann Benétreau-Dupin

Publication date: 8 March 2017

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.8488

zbMATH Keywords

ignoranceindifferenceBayesian confirmation theoryprinciple of indifferenceanthropic reasoningdoomsday argumentimprecise credence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Related Items (1)

Eternal inflation: when probabilities fail

Cites Work

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