On some counter-counter-examples about classical inference

DOI10.6092/issn.1973-2201/3526zbMath1453.62270OpenAlexW1522042938MaRDI QIDQ5148372

Benito V. Frosini

Publication date: 4 February 2021

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/article/botrivsta/v_3a68_3ay_3a2008_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a135-152.htm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

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