Worst-case bounds on power vs. proportion in weighted voting games with an application to false-name manipulation

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.13136MaRDI QIDQ5154768zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date 5 October 2021

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.09216

zbMATH Keywords

autonomous agentsdecision theorygame theorymathematical foundations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

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Cites work

• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
• False-name manipulation in weighted voting games is hard for probabilistic polynomial time
• False-name manipulation in weighted voting games: empirical and theoretical analysis
• False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4149923 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• L S Penrose's limit theorem: tests by simulation
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems
• Singular Games have Asymptotic Values
• Some inequalities relating to the partial sum of binomial probabilities
• The complexity of power-index comparison
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• Voting power and proportional representation of voters
• Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention

Cited in

(8)

• False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
• False-name manipulation in weighted voting games: empirical and theoretical analysis
• Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
• False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games Is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time
• False-name manipulation in weighted voting games is hard for probabilistic polynomial time
• Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks
• On subgame consistency of the Shapley-Shubik power index
• A coalitional extension of the ordinal Shapley-Shubik value

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