Optimal contracts for outsourcing of repair and restoration services

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2013.1210MaRDI QIDQ5166283zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Nitish Jain, Sameer Hasija, Dana G. Popescu

Publication date 26 June 2014

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a0e1c0d779a1bcf8b811e3910350b461af190f7b

zbMATH Keywords

double-sided moral hazardfinancial distressmachine repairman modelperformance-based contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)

Recommendations

• Optimal contract for machine repair and maintenance
• Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems
• Optimal maintenance service contract negotiation with aging equipment
• A model for maintenance service contract design, negotiation and optimization
• Optimal decision making in a maintenance service operation

Cited in

(8)

• Negotiation for service contracting: incentives, bargaining power, and customer risk aversion
• Percentage rent contracts between co-stores
• Service supply chain management: a review of operational models
• After-sale service deployment and information sharing in a supply chain under demand uncertainty
• Optimizing production and maintenance for the service-oriented manufacturing supply chain
• Contracting for infrequent restoration and recovery of mission-critical systems
• When less is more: recovery technology investment and segmentation for uptime-centered services
• Contract design for equipment after-sales service with business interruption insurance

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