Optimal Contracts for Outsourcing of Repair and Restoration Services

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2013.1210zbMath1296.90037WikidataQ113076596 ScholiaQ113076596MaRDI QIDQ5166283

Nitish Jain, Sameer Hasija, Dana G. Popescu

Publication date: 26 June 2014

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a0e1c0d779a1bcf8b811e3910350b461af190f7b

zbMATH Keywords

double-sided moral hazardfinancial distressmachine repairman modelperformance-based contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)

Related Items (7)

Service supply chain management: a review of operational models ⋮ When less is more: recovery technology investment and segmentation for uptime-centered services ⋮ Optimizing production and maintenance for the service-oriented manufacturing supply chain ⋮ Negotiation for service contracting: incentives, bargaining power, and customer risk aversion ⋮ Percentage rent contracts between co-stores ⋮ Contract design for equipment after-sales service with business interruption insurance ⋮ After-sale service deployment and information sharing in a supply chain under demand uncertainty

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