Reminder game: indirectness in persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.09.011MaRDI QIDQ516992zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toru Suzuki

Publication date 16 March 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.011

zbMATH Keywords

communication gameendogenous consideration setimperfect recallindirectness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Persuasion under costly learning
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

Cites work

• Bounded memory and biases in information processing
• Consideration sets and competitive marketing
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• On the strategic use of attention grabbers
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Search Decisions with Limited Memory
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• Strategic Information Transmission

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