Reminder game: indirectness in persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.09.011zbMATH Open1394.91057OpenAlexW2530051580MaRDI QIDQ516992FDOQ516992

Toru Suzuki

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.011

zbMATH Keywords

communication gameendogenous consideration setimperfect recallindirectness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing
• Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Search Decisions with Limited Memory
• On the strategic use of attention grabbers

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