Social values and cooperation. Results from an iterated prisoner's dilemma experiment

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_32MaRDI QIDQ5176299zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jürgen Fleiß, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger

Publication date 3 March 2015

Published in Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_32

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

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(8)

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