Convergence analysis of iterated best response for a trusted computation game

DOI10.1016/j.automatica.2016.11.046zbMath1357.93064arXiv1611.02329OpenAlexW2556464320MaRDI QIDQ518294

Cédric Langbort, Alberto Speranzon, Shaunak D. Bopardikar

Publication date: 28 March 2017

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.02329

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycomputational methodsadversarial machine learningiterated best response

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) 2-person games (91A05) Control/observation systems involving computers (process control, etc.) (93C83)

Related Items

Characterizing oscillations in heterogeneous populations of coordinators and anticoordinators, Convergence analysis of iterated best response for a trusted computation game, Equilibrium analysis and incentive-based control of the anticoordinating networked game dynamics

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