A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
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Publication:5187107
DOI10.2307/2297669zbMath0561.90100MaRDI QIDQ5187107
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297669
91A10: Noncooperative games
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