Imprecise Bayesianism and global belief inertia

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXX033MaRDI QIDQ5210642zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aron Vallinder

Publication date 21 January 2020

Published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://philarchive.org/rec/AROIBA

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10)

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Cited in

(13)

• Updating confidence in beliefs
• Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences
• Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities
• The accuracy and rationality of imprecise credences
• Coin flips, credences and the reflection principle
• A dilemma for the imprecise Bayesian
• The Bayesian who knew too much
• Total evidence, uncertainty and a priori beliefs
• Uncertainty, equality, fraternity
• Higher-order evidence and losing one's conviction
• Credal imprecision and the value of evidence
• A comparison of imprecise Bayesianism and Dempster-Shafer theory for automated decisions under ambiguity
• A unified treatment of risk and ambiguity within a rank-dependent framework

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