Recursive Contracts

DOI10.3982/ECTA9902zbMath1431.91202MaRDI QIDQ5214112

Ramon Marimon, Albert Marcet

Publication date: 7 February 2020

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9902

zbMATH Keywords

Lagrangian multipliers; dynamic optimization; saddle-points; time inconsistency; limited commitment; Bellman equations; recursive methods; Ramsey equilibrium; limited enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B55: Economic dynamics

91B41: Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection)

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