Weighted games of best choice
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Publication:5215902
Abstract: The game of best choice (also known as the secretary problem) is a model for sequential decision making with a long history and many variations. The classical setup assumes that the sequence of candidate rankings are uniformly distributed. Given a statistic on the symmetric group, one can instead weight each permutation according to an exponential function in the statistic. We play the game of best choice on the Ewens and Mallows distributions that are obtained in this way from the number of left-to-right maxima and number of inversions in the permutation, respectively. For each of these, we give the optimal strategy and probability of winning. Moreover, we introduce a general class of permutation statistics that always produces games of best choice whose optimal strategies are positional, which simplifies their analysis considerably.
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Cites work
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Cited in
(12)- Choosing from a weighted tournament
- Avoiding patterns and making the best choice
- Finding the second-best candidate under the Mallows model
- Strategy-indifferent games of best choice
- On weighted balls-into-bins games
- Positional strategies in games of best choice
- Weighted Matching in Chess Tournaments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7533361 (Why is no real title available?)
- Query-based selection of optimal candidates under the Mallows model
- Optimal stopping methodology for the secretary problem with random queries
- Quasi-polynomial time approximation schemes for assortment optimization under Mallows-based rankings
- Classical patterns in Mallows permutations
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