Handbook of Computational Social Choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5228018
DOI10.1017/CBO9781107446984zbMath1436.91001MaRDI QIDQ5228018
No author found.
Publication date: 8 August 2019
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984
91A12: Cooperative games
91B12: Voting theory
91-08: Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B14: Social choice
91-00: General reference works (handbooks, dictionaries, bibliographies, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
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