Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
From MaRDI portal
Publication:523005
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002zbMath1393.91119OpenAlexW2182266207MaRDI QIDQ523005
John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002
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