Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
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Publication:523005
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.002zbMATH Open1393.91119OpenAlexW2182266207MaRDI QIDQ523005FDOQ523005
John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.002
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Cited In (36)
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
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- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
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- Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
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- Multilateral matching
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- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
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