How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.004MaRDI QIDQ523024zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Howard Rosenthal, Nilanjan Roy, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcommunicationmessage spacepublic good provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• An experimental study of collective deliberation
• Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information

Cited in

(19)

• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
• Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination
• Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization
• The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
• Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?
• Environmental feedback and cooperation in climate change dilemma
• Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• Communication and visibility in public goods provision
• The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
• Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
• Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies
• Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation
• Social Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods
• Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?
• An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players
• Many-strategy games in groups with relatives and the evolution of coordinated cooperation
• Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness

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